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A ticklish question runs through Daniel Albright’s Panaesthetics: what, or 
which, or whose Pan? The Greek god Pan is promiscuous, seductively mu-
sical, all–encompassing and self–fissioning; the camera pan shifts our gaze 
to refocus on new visual fields or subjects; pan– prefixes relatedly imply 
some fusion or bringing–together of various elements (pan–American—
pansexual—pandemonium). To which Albright might answer: all of them, 
and none of them too. This maddening brand of dialectical thinking is a 
hallmark of Panaesthetics, which begins with grandiose statements about 
what art is but often gets sidestepped with some eccentric examples drawn 
from the fringes of the canon, tripped up trying to make use of its own 
clunky vocabulary and ends seemingly confused about its own status as art 
theory or art appreciation.
Much of Daniel Albright’s work has been in the field of “compara-
tive arts”—a broader, significantly newer off–branch from Comparative 
Literature, the department many aspiring students of letters come to after 
realizing they can no longer “just study English” at most advanced learn-
ing institutions. Following this, perhaps Comparative Arts may too replace 
close study of the individual arts entirely; a welcome development for 
Albright, who has consistently and often quite compellingly shown the in-
terpretive advantage of unbinding artworks from their original mediums. 
His earlier Untwisting the Serpent: Modernism in Music, Literature, and 
Other Arts (Albright 2000) and more recent Music Speaks (Albright 2009) 
cover similar inter–arts territory, which is here significantly extended 
towards a broader history of the “unity and diversity” of the arts, from 
the crudely beautiful Lascaux paintings through to the crude beauty of 
Modernism and onwards. Along the way Albright’s theory of comparative 
arts inevitably becomes one of comparative aesthetics too, panning across 
the work of Adorno, Heidegger and Greenberg back to Plato, the West’s 
first aesthetic theorist. A latent question binds this broad excursus across 
theory and praxis (that is, from cavemen to de Man): are the arts many, or 
are they one?
Albright approaches an answer with the compelling suggestion that 
art’s transmedial impulses are born of our own transmedial biases. Since 
any description of art must be mediated through the art of language, for 
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instance, it is possible through language (description, theory, ekphrasis) 
to join unlike arts across their various mediums. The synaesthetic feel of 
a given artwork is both a property of art and a property of perception. 
Albright’s prose style consistently embodies this point: that all art (in-
cluding its criticism) is bound to dream it were other arts, and thereby 
confuse mediums and sense modalities alike. “Every medium is the wrong 
medium,” writes Albright (2014, 277), but the dizzying, slippery realm of 
synaesthetic analyses can be baffling: when he discusses the ontology of 
painting under such self–evidently inexplicable headings as The Speech 
of Light and The Speech of Touch, it is clear we are dealing with intricate 
metaphorical constructions at a rather profound level.
Panaesthetics opens with four theses: that artworks become meaning-
ful through their perceived “constructedness”; that artworks exert emo-
tional forces on our bodies by drawing us into a sympathetic, symbiotic 
space; that all art is already meta–art; and that art is a language. These 
theses are instantly negated (e.g. artworks needn’t mean anything; art is a 
non–language), setting the stage for subsequent slips and slides across art’s 
histories and medias. Albright navigates these dialectics with the childlike 
wonder of a Barthes, the original amateur of the arts, to whose style of 
gently inquisitive pondering and polymathic dilettantism Albright is in-
debted. Indeed it is that very lack of overt commitment to any one art form, 
thesis, or theory that gives Albright his mercurial gliding power. Of the 
four theses, the one concerning the role of [perceived] intentionality in an 
artwork is especially refreshing: Albright baldly states that “Anything is an 
artwork to the extent that it looks made” (2014, 4). This logic is generously 
extended to the realm of natural phenomena (mountains, trees) since even 
the most agnostic viewer still perceives some act of having been created, 
inscribed on or within these various “art–objects” like a maker’s stamp. 
Since all that is has been created, anything can be viewed as art so long 
as there exists some discernible force of intention, be it faint, fanciful, or 
overt. This neatly circumnavigates the untrendy issue of authorial intent by 
repositioning the question of intentionality to the viewer’s gaze. Albright 
readily argues that art must oblige its viewers’ demands to mean what they 
demand it means; thus art appreciation and art theory are fused in a diz-
zying, interpretive dance of rhetoric. And indeed it is the realm of rhetoric 
(not biography, nor theory, nor history, nor technic, though he will readily 
draw on these) that the strength and persuasiveness of Albright’s argu-
ments dwell. When he writes “An artwork has little power of resistance to 
description or interpretation” (2014, 215) he might have considered that 
we too in reading Panaesthetics are powerless to resist these same beguiling 
descriptions and interpretations. The contrary dictum “We are also free, by 
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a focal adjustment of the mind’s eye, to abandon the quest for meaning” 
(2014, 5), however, offers the chance to contrarily disregard his conclu-
sions at every turn. This capriciousness lends the book a playful edge.
The bulk of Panaesthetics splits into two parts. “Part One: Individual 
Media” presents a nobly futile (though hardly fruitless) effort to examine 
the arts of literature, painting, and music in isolation, at least for the sake 
of establishing some basic defining features of these respective medias 
before things get truly messy in “Part Two: Art Rampant.” This structure 
extends and embodies the Introduction’s dialectical tone: Part One largely 
asserts the diversity of the individual arts only to be torn asunder in 
Part Two’s exploration of transmedialization, “pseudomorphoses” (after 
Adorno), and the like. Yet even in isolation, Albright cannot help but 
discuss the tendency for each individual art media to aspire to the condi-
tions of other medias. Ekphrasis, musical “word–painting” and allegorical 
painting are classic, if typical examples. Albright has more than just these 
in mind, but the breadth of this project combined with a thirst for (over–)
classification often causes Part One to lose focus. Within Individual Media 
we find the chapter “What Is Painting?” Within that chapter we find the 
section “Ekphrasis.” Under “Ekphrasis” Albright describes two “modes” at 
the extremes of objectivity and subjectivity, namely: 1) poet as transcriber 
(most objective); and 2) poet as participant (most subjective), which fur-
ther split into several sub–modes, for example: “the poet’s sensibility might 
be transformed as the image effects a kind of seizure.” Finally, within each 
of these sub–sub–classifications Albright gives a number of contrasting 
examples. This not atypical splintering of definitions/modes into so many 
innumerable sub–species begins to feel like the catalogue is overtaking 
the totality, the map so detailed it swallows the very territory it describes. 
Albright’s chapters in general tend to spin away from the topic at hand, in-
cluding a bizarre, scrawny digression into cinema three–quarters through 
the painting discussion. Doesn’t cinema warrant its own chapter? What 
ultimately sustains the line of thought is Albright’s great charm and per-
suasion as a writer, though even these cannot carry the reader across some 
of the more wandering chasms.
A larger problem, however, is the lack of balance between Parts One 
and Two. The second half is strangely dwarfed by the first, even though the 
realm of “rampant art” should be where Albright shines and could thus 
benefit from more extensive treatment. The placement of the chapter “Nine 
Definitions” some 200 pages into the book is unaccountable. This chapter’s 
propositions read like an introductory crash–course in the vocabulary 
Albright could have fruitfully employed in the first half of Panaesthetics. 
One of the sorry ill–effects of this ordering is that, coming so late in the 
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book, these definitions (concinnity—eidolon—pseudomorph) are hardly 
put to productive use and remain in the reader’s mind like foreign con-
cepts without adequate demonstration—and terms such as concinnity and 
abrasion do not readily advertise their own usefulness, being conceptually 
indistinct from consonance and dissonance.
The realm of music, and music’s relations with the other arts, is 
Albright’s home medium. Not incidentally, music also proves most prone 
to panaesthetic fancies since the uncertainty of music’s language (and 
indeed its questionable status as a language at all), its utter invisibility 
and maddening ineffability, coalesce in music’s uncanny ability to mean 
everything, embody anything, oblige any interpretation or ultimately 
mean nothing, often seemingly at once. The slippery art par excellence, 
a selection of passages on music examined in greater detail will prove ex-
emplary of Albright’s various tactics and conclusions. Extending the argu-
ment “language understands everything as language” (8), Albright spends 
a great deal of time pondering music’s quasi–linguistic character (the same 
topic has indeed been explored at length, from Adorno to Deryck Cooke to 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff). Albright welcomes the music–as–language con-
ceptualization but pays keen attention to the paradoxes which inevitably 
emerge: “One axiom of musical semantics is that as semantic conventions 
grow rigid they become, paradoxically, less meaningful: when music grows 
too easy to interpret, the ear hears the interpretation and not the music” 
(160). In other words, since clichés in language tend to either ossify mean-
ing or distract from the process of signification, semantic codes in music 
rely on a certain extant currency within a musical community, but as cur-
rency they also risk inflation whereby more music is needed to mean as 
much as was signified earlier. Familiarity, at a point, breeds indifference; 
clichés become hollowed–out and need periodic renewal, and art responds 
to this call for renewal with its cycles of forward–looking avant–gardes and 
historicist neo– movements.
Albright also appears to be deeply skeptical about the music–as–lan-
guage model, even while entertaining its basic tenets. He raises the issue 
of rhetoric, for instance, not being an intrinsic feature of music, but rather 
a break at music’s limit, a sort of malfunctioning of music’s parameters to 
allow for quasi–linguistic intrusions foreign to its lack of clear referents, its 
inability to speak in a “past tense”:
The more closely we examine the hypothesis that music is a language, 
whether in theory of practice, the less tenable it appears. After exhaus-
tive study of Mattheson’s tables of tropes and of many other old treatises, 
the musicologist George J. Buelow . . . concludes, “Many of the musical 
figures . . . originated in attempts to explain or justify irregular, if not 
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incorrect, contrapuntal writing.” In other words, the rhetorical aspects 
of music seem to be concentrated in various areas of deviance from ac-
cepted musical practice; so we are left with the uncomfortable dilemma 
that music is a kind of rhetoric, even while music is more rhetorical when 
it breaks down than when it obeys the rules. (171, emphasis added)
Later, Albright considers ways that music might aspire to the conditions 
of language even without being one—riffing on a Borges tale in which 
a noun–less language uses only verbs to signify without referents (“The 
moon rose over the river” translates into “Upward, behind the onstreaming it 
mooned”), Albright proposes that music might also be thought of as a lan-
guage in this capacity, with only verbs, as it can seemingly describe action 
(whether through established codes or degrees of acoustic verisimilitude 
like storms, birds, or rain) even without clear referents or nouns.
In analyzing music’s non–linguistic character, however, Albright finds 
that music paradoxically becomes more language–like. Arguments for 
music’s abstract, non–linguistic nature still tend to evoke language–like 
qualities even in defense against music’s powerlessness to express anything. 
These arguments tend to rely on the visual arts or the visual medium (a 
position most typically characterized by Eduard Hanslick or Stravinsky) to 
explain how music means, that is, not as language but as “visual art real-
ized in sound.” And yet music by this account still retains traces of the 
linguistic, detectable in such language as dramatic/narrative structures, 
rhetorical modes, gestural movements, etc. Or observe the work of French 
post–structuralists Derrida, Saussure or de Man: how language itself can as 
easily be thought of as fractured and incoherent, with its endlessly deferred 
signifiers never leading out of language to any reality. If music is a defective 
language, then certainly language per se can also be seen as defective by 
those same arguments. Albright has effectively underscored one of music’s 
most pervasive contradictions: “the more we try to understand music as 
language, the more strongly it resists that understanding; and the more 
we try to understand music as the opposite of language, the more sweetly, 
strongly, plainly it speaks to the ear” (177).
When discussing music’s tackling of so–called origin mythologies, 
Albright misses a major opportunity to extend his discussion of “music’s 
mythologies”—that is, music which explicitly tackles musico–narration of 
creation myths, or “points towards its own origins.” He consistently reiter-
ates that all artworks point toward their own origins (“The artwork contains 
within itself the history of its medium” [177]), even overturning Heidegger’s 
analysis of Van Gogh’s Shoes to assert that the real subject is not the harsh 
peasant life but rather the history of visual arts itself, the mud on the bottom 
of the shoe being imaginatively re–written as mud transplanted from the 
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cave walls at Lascaux. Yet moving to music, Albright seems curiously stuck 
in either Greek (Orphic) or Judeo–Christian (Creation) myths when dis-
cussing music’s “pointing towards its own origins”—focusing on the rather 
obvious (though no less spectacular) case of Haydn’s Creation or Rebel’s Les 
elémens, the kind of example which doesn’t so much require illumination 
as mere mention, and later, more curiously, Schoenberg’s obscure Genesis 
Suite. Albright might have moved beyond these rather isolated examples of 
religious/mythological origin narratives toward more “agnostic” creation 
narratives in music; for instance, how the initiatory move from unpitched 
to pitched music in Berg’s Drei Orchesterstücke or Carter’s Double Concerto 
compellingly suggests a narrative of creation ex nihilo.
Albright does indeed suggest a musical narrative derived from a “sci-
entific account of creation” but only mentions Xenakis’ Pithoprakta as an 
example for modeling chaos. This discussion still feels rather thin with-
out a true accounting for non–theistic origin myths in music. Spending 
so much time describing what is arguably Stravinsky’s weakest piece, The 
Flood, makes the omission all the more frustrating. Ultimately what this 
section lacks is not an exhaustive compendium of possible creation narra-
tives in music but rather an account of the ease with which any music can 
be made to embody an origin narrative; moreover, that the ur–narrative 
implied by and underlying such diverse but flexibly applicable narratives 
is the medium of music itself. Music’s time–bound quality and amorphous 
ambiguities mean that every piece must unfold (indeed, must create itself) 
before its listeners each performance. While individual compositions may 
capitalize on this particular quirk of music at the service of a specific nar-
rative program, in reality each piece of music already tells a creation myth 
each time it sounds for us—its own creation myth, yes, but also music’s.
Albright goes to great lengths to salvage the narrative dimension of 
music. He considers narrativity an indispensable feature of all music, not 
just programmatic music. Put another way, music is particularly flexible 
when asked to carry the semiotic weight of narration: all music “deals 
in various nameless–nesses, and yet half–namable apparitions keep ee-
rily coming into being” (201). Toward a definition of music: “nameless yet 
half–namable apparitions”—ever absorbent, ever ready to entertain our 
fanciful readings hurled at it. Yet this hyper absorption is also maddening 
in the interpretive promiscuities it allows. Like Sartre’s beautiful aphorism 
(music: the belle muette, with eyes full of meaning), she smiles at us and 
answers yes too willingly to all our inquiries, convinces us our riddle solv-
ings are the right ones; we step aside, satisfied, only to watch the next suitor 




Later Albright most productively takes the Adorno argument (“Music 
is a narrative that narrates nothing”) to task, by way of a loving critique 
of Jean–Jacques Nattiez’s Music and Discourse. Nattiez, to summarize, 
extends Adorno’s argument but focusing on the that narrates nothing as-
pect, grounding it in a linguistic critique which finds music (unlike real 
language) unable to extend its referents beyond the level of its “sonorous 
discourse.” Because of this, “music cannot lie. The responsibility for joining 
character–phantoms with action–shadows lies with me, the listener, since 
it does not lie within music’s semiological capacities to join subject and 
predicate” (Nattiez, quoted in Albright 2014, 202).
Very well, but Albright shows that the wealth of interpretive narratives 
which a given piece of music seems to welcome, that same promiscuous 
yes, is not a sign of its semiological deficiencies but rather points toward 
music operating “at the narrative core of things” (204). The same conclu-
sion which might have made the section on music and origin mythologies 
stronger (that is, that music’s very medium constitutes its creation myth) is 
inevitably reached here: for the narratives music deals in, welcomes, emu-
lates, are also all ur–narratives. That we tend to get squeamish when such 
narratives are too clearly articulated does not discount music’s narrative 
capacity: it only points to a distaste for music whose meaning terminates, 
freezes, in a hyper–specific individual narrative. But music’s capacity, 
indeed its tendency, to entertain narrative reading suggests more basic 
narrative structures either set into motion by composers or read into the 
work by narrative–minded listeners. Albright suggests that even literary 
narratives, with precisely those subject/predicate relationships denied to 
music, still function as ur–narratives: “it could be said that a written narra-
tive is nothing but an incitement [for us] to make a narrative, since written 
stories…become significant to us only insofar as we fill in their blanks, as 
we remap them onto private grids of thought and feeling” (206).
The strange brevity of Part Two (80 pages compared to the previous 
200) remains baffling. While the book does set out to account for both 
the unity and diversity of the arts, “Art Rampant” is the most proper place 
for Albright to develop everything he has diligently set up in Part One 
and put his comparative arts theory to productive work. The discussion of 
“pseudomorphoses” should constitute the meat of Albright’s argument, as 
they are the most characteristic byproducts of panaesthetic pedigree, yet 
his examples often feel thinly sketched or oddly chosen. Six whole pages 
are eaten up quoting Leonardo da Vinci in the section on pseudomorphs 
(“From Painting to Music”), yet da Vinci doesn’t even describe anything 
related to music but rather ruminates on the superiority of painting as a 
medium, which grates against the framework of Albright’s discussion of 
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music born of painting. But the topic of the visual medium’s influence on, 
and entry into, the realm of music is far too interesting to be left at that. 
Albright limits himself to depictions of battle scenes in music and, beyond 
a work by Gloria Coates after Van Gogh, nothing more. The omission of 
Pictures at an Exhibition is curious. Albright’s privileging of non–canonic 
examples over more normative fare proves rather typical of Panaesthetics. 
“Art Rampant: Pseudomorphs” opens with a sweeping dismissal in this 
vein: “The commonest pseudomorphic translations are from literature to 
picture…and from picture to literature…[but] here I will treat four of the 
less common cross–medial thrusts among three important media” (234). 
Does Albright wish to examine exemplary works in the sense of typical or 
in the sense of extraordinary, uncommon? That is, is his theory best served 
by cherry–picking a rather limited number of works which adequately 
demonstrate his concepts, or is a larger theory of art being offered but one 
from which Albright chooses to underscore his points with less–than–
typical examples? Albright clearly has a taste for the unusual, and there is 
a freshness to fringe art fare. Albright’s enthusiasm for these is consistently 
compelling, but omitting such a major work as Mussorgsky’s in apparent 
avoidance of the better–known leaves his treatment of the topic of musical 
ekphrasis rather unconvincing.
Moreover, an important ancillary point might have been made when 
Albright brings up Xenakis’ use of technology to transform visual sketches 
into music, considering this a brand of musical ekphrasis. Yet the process 
of transferring the orientation of the visual plane onto the time and pitch 
domain of music is in fact what music notation in the Western tradition 
already accomplishes. And by this logic isn’t all music (notation) a form 
of ekphrasis? The development of these notational codes is so intertwined 
with the visual field and how time and space are mapped within these codes 
that a compelling argument could be made that composers have actually 
learned to think music visually, at least in some major ways throughout 
the process of structuring, even conceiving of music. All scores are graphic 
scores, types of “sound pictures,” so all music within notated traditions is in 
this sense “ekphrastic.” It is an unfortunate oversight for a book grappling 
with cross–talk between the arts, and inter–medial blurring, to not even 
touch upon this point.
A more pressing issue here and throughout Albright’s oeuvre is the 
liberal reusing of sentences, paragraphs, or entire sub–chapters from his 
own earlier publications. The sections on music and/–as–language, for in-
stance, appear verbatim in the opening chapter of Music Speaks (when one 
encounters so seemingly rare a sentence as “The persimmons are mottled 
but unripe” in two separate publications the effect of such rhetorical flour-
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ish is sadly dampened). A frequent and sought–after lecturer, it is under-
standable that Albright would draw from his own body of notes, slides 
and asides when publishing new work; knowing that the material from 
both Music Speaks and Panaesthetics began as lectures partially illuminates 
these works’ wandering, sometimes digressive structures.1 But the lack 
of new perspectives on older material is frustrating, and the covert, or at 
least unacknowledged way these chapters are reused across different works 
betrays a somewhat lax attitude toward originality. The ease with which 
almost the entirety of the opening chapter of Music Speaks was inserted 
into Panaesthetics is itself problematic: are these arguments so imprecise, 
so beguilingly obscurant at times, to smoothly migrate between books with 
totally different trajectories and wildly divergent structures without really 
altering those trajectories? Or was it the ultimate ambition of Albright’s 
thinking to erode the divisions between not only artworks, but between 
the works about art?
In the final pages of Panaesthetics, Albright pans back to the dialecti-
cal nature of the opening Introduction having drawn two contradictory 
conclusions: the aforementioned aphorism every medium of an artwork 
is the wrong medium, and its opposite: every artistic medium is the right 
medium. That we feel so endlessly obliged to rip every artwork from its 
origin medium into the verbal realm of description more supports the lat-
ter conclusion, or at least points toward the necessity of aesthetics (both 
hermeneutics and theory) as a vital extension of what constitutes the closed 
art object, if such a thing ever did exist. Criticism makes porous art more 
porous still—it can breathe more even as it bleeds, its hermetic essence 
now draining away, now restored again. Panaesthetics, and Panaesthetics, 
is above all a life–giving force in and of art, as mediums steal and skip 
and slip across mediums to renew themselves, freely colonizing other arts. 
Albright channels this boundless appetite. Indeed the final slippery go–
between, the ultimate panaesthetic ambiguity here, involves the blurred 
lines between those very worlds of praxis and theory, between art and 
its aesthetics. As both literature and theory Panaesthetics proves a hugely 
enjoyable and insightful feat of imaginative, sometimes fanciful thinking 
about—and through—the arts.
POSTSCRIPT: Daniel Albright passed away unexpectedly on January 
3, 2015, not long after this review had been completed. He was only 69 
years old. Panaesthetics is thus the last work published during Albright’s 
own lifetime. The book at hand may ultimately prove to be the summit of 
Albright’s project: “At the time of his death he had recently published the 
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book he referred to as the most philosophical of his life, and in many ways 
the culmination of his life’s work: Panaesthetics: On the Unity and Diversity 
of the Arts.”2
Notes
1. From the preface to Music Speaks: “The volume you have in your hand is a sort of rehears-
al–piano reduction of a number of multimedia lectures I’ve given in the past few years” (Al-
bright 2009, xiii). From the preface to Panaesthetics: “[T]his book grows out of the Anthony 
Hecht lectures I gave [at Bard College] in 2012” (Albright 2014, xi).
2. “Panaesthetics,” Daniel Albright, http://panaesthetics.org.
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